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ABSTRACT 
The ever increasing use and reliance upon computers in both the public and 
private sector has led to enormous numbers of computers being disposed of at the 
end of their useful life within an organisation. As the cost of computers has 
dropped, their use in the home has also continued to increase. In most 
organisations, computers have a relatively short life and are replaced on a regular 
basis with the result that, if not properly cleansed of data, they are released into 
the public domain containing data that can be relatively up to date. This problem 
is exacerbated by the increasing popularity and use of smart phones, which also 
contain significant storage capacity. From the results of the research it remains 
clear that the majority of organisations and private individuals that are using these 
computers still remain ignorant or misinformed of the potential volume and type 
of information that is stored on the hard disks contained within these systems. The 
evidence of the research is that neither organisations nor individuals have 
considered, or are aware of, the potential impact of the information that is 
contained in the disks from these systems becoming available to an unintended 
third party.  
This is the fifth study in an ongoing research programme being conducted into the 
levels and types of information that remain on computer hard disks that have been 
offered for sale on the second hand market. This ongoing research series has been 
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undertaken to gain an understanding of the level and types of information that 
remains on these disks, to determine the damage that could potentially be caused 
if the information was misused, and to determine whether there are any 
developing trends. The disks used have been purchased in a number of countries. 
The rationale for this was to determine whether there are any national or regional 
differences in the way that computer disks are disposed of and to compare the 
results for any regional or temporal trends. The disks were obtained from a wide 
range of sources in each of the regions in order to minimise the effect of any 
action by an individual source.  
The first study was carried out in 2005 and since then has been repeated annually 
with the scope being incrementally extended to include additional research 
partners and countries. The study in 2009 was carried out by British 
Telecommunications (BT) and the University of Glamorgan in the UK, Edith 
Cowan University in Australia, Khalifa University in the United Arab Emirates 
and Longwood University in the USA.   
The core methodology of the research has remained unaltered throughout the 
duration of the study. The methodology has included the acquisition of a number 
of second hand computer disks from a range of sources and determining whether 
the data contained on the disks has been effectively erased or if they still contain 
information relating to previous owners. If information was found on the disks 
from which the previous user or owner could be identified, the research examined 
whether it was of a sensitive nature or in a sufficient volume to represent a risk. 
One of the consistent results of the research through the entire period has been 
that, for a significant proportion of the disks that have been examined, there was 
sufficient information present to pose a risk of a compromise of sensitive 
information to either the organisation or the individual that had previously used 
the disks. The potential impacts of the exposure of this information could include 
embarrassment to individuals and organisations, fraud, blackmail and identity 
theft. In every year since the study started, criminal activity has also been 
exposed. As has been stated in the previous reports, where the disks had 
originated from organisations, they had, in many cases, failed to meet their 
statutory, regulatory and legal obligations.  
In the 2009 study, the fifth in the series, the research methodology that had been 
followed in the previous studies was repeated, but in addition Khalifa University 
of Science Technology and research contributed to the analysis of the disks.  
Keywords: Computer forensics, disk analysis, data recovery, data disposal, data 
destruction, data leakage, privacy.  
1. INTRODUCTION  
This research series was initiated in January 2005 (Jones et al, 2005). The results 
of the first study revealed that a significant proportion of the disks that were 
examined still contained large amounts of information, in many cases sensitive, 
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from which the previous owner or user could be identified. Prior to the 
publication of this first study report there had been limited research into this 
subject, with the most significant findings being reported by (Garfinkel and 
Shelat, 2003). There had been a small number of limited surveys conducted or 
sponsored by vendors and a number of newspaper reports on the discovery of 
personal data found on disks that had not been correctly disposed of. This first 
study report showed that the majority of the disks that were obtained still 
contained significant quantities of sensitive information that the researchers 
considered had the potential to cause embarrassment or financial harm to either 
the organisation or the individual.   
As in the previous years, all of the research has been conducted under the same 
conditions (using commonly and easily available tools that have similar 
capabilities) and the results then compared. The recommendations that have been 
made as a result of the research are on ways in which the destruction or erasure of 
data from disks that were being disposed of could be improved.   
This paper, the report on the fifth and latest survey, contains the results of the 
2009 research which has had the same objectives as the research in the previous 
years. The research was again sponsored by British Telecommunications (BT) 
and Sims Lifecycle Services.  
2. THE RESEARCH  
Throughout the duration of the research, in order to maintain consistency, the 
same objectives, processes and procedures that were used in the original study 
have been followed. Other studies have been spawned by the research, including a 
“dead disk” study that is currently ongoing at the University of Glamorgan, where 
disks that were not working when originally tested have had further extensive 
testing and investigation to determine the causes of the failures and the level of 
difficulty that recovery of the data contained would entail. Throughout the entire 
period, all of the disks used in the research were purchased at computer auctions, 
computer fairs or through eBay in the respective regions. The disks were acquired 
discretely and in small batches by a number of purchasers so that the sellers 
would not have any indication of the reason for purchases. A second reason for 
purchasing the disks either singly or in small batches was to minimise any 
influence that the practices of one seller might have had on the overall results.   
In 2009, consistent with the research in each of the previous years, the disks were 
supplied “blind” to the researchers so that they had no external visual indicators of 
the potential source of the disks. The only markings on the disks that the 
researchers were provided with were sequential serial numbers so that each disk 
could be uniquely identified throughout the process. By supplying them in this 
way, any information that is recovered by the researchers could be clearly 
identified as having been the result of the data that was available on the disk.  
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The research methodology remained unchanged from earlier research (Jones 
2005, 2006, 2008) with each disk being forensically imaged using verified 
software and then placed in a secure storage container. All subsequent analysis 
was undertaken on the forensic images. The rationale for this time consuming step 
remained unchanged from previous years and was to meet two requirements. The 
first was the need to preserve the original media in an unaltered state and store it 
in a secure area in case reportable criminal activity was detected and there was a 
requirement to pass the disks on to the police. The second reason was to allow the 
research to be carried out in a non-intrusive manner that did not affect or change 
the original data in case any anomalies were detected with the image and it was 
necessary to validate the data against a second image created from the original. As 
in previous years, this proved to be a sensible precaution, as two of the disks were 
found to contain material that necessitated them being handed over to law 
enforcement for further investigation.  
The tools used in the 2009 study were fundamentally the same as those used in 
the previous years (although the versions of the tools may have changed). The 
tools performed similar functions to the Windows Unformat and Undelete 
commands and that of a hex editor (which was used to view any information that 
exists in the unallocated portions of the disk). All of the tools that perform this 
type of functionality are freely available: examples include the Linux based 
Autopsy (Version 2.24) and The Sleuth Kit (version 3.1.3)1 software. These types 
of tools do not require significant levels of skill or knowledge to effect the 
recovery of remnant data from storage media and there are now numerous online 
tutorials for operation of these tools for the purposes of data recovery.  The 
objectives have remained the same as in previous years: firstly to determine if the 
disks had been effectively cleansed of data, secondly, if they still contained 
information, whether it was either visible or easily recoverable with the tools 
identified above. The third objective of the research was to determine whether the 
information present on the disk would allow for the identification of the 
organisation or individual(s) that had used the disk’s host computer.   The results 
of the 2009 survey indicate that, over the last five years, there has been small but 
consistent improvement in the proportion of the disks that contain sensitive 
organisational or personal information that are made available in the second-hand 
market. Before detailing the results of the 2009 survey, the results of the studies in 
the preceding years are briefly described below.   
3. SUMMARY OF THE PREVIOUS RESEARCH RESULTS  
Over the whole of the period of the series of studies, one of the issues that has 
been highlighted is the fact that, to date, nearly half of the second hand disks that 
were obtained and could be accessed, have had some attempt made to remove the 
data. In the majority of these cases, the attempts were unsuccessful. The majority 
                                                 
1 The Sleuth Kit, http://www.sleuthkit.org/index.php  
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of those disks contained data that could easily be recovered by either connecting 
the disk to another computer or through the use of the basic tools that are 
described elsewhere in this paper. In the majority of cases, these disks contained 
sufficient data to allow the previous owner, whether an organisation or an 
individual, to be identified. Around twenty percent of the disks contained 
financial information relating to organisations, including staff salary details, sales 
receipts and profit and loss reports. A number of the disks could be identified as 
having been used in the organisations that were part of the critical infrastructure 
such as power generation, water and telecommunications utilities.  Throughout 
the period of these studies, there has been an increasing awareness of the impacts 
of data breaches, data losses and identity theft that has come about as a result of 
regular publicity of incidents together with the publication of the results of a 
number of surveys and reports (Price Waterhouse Cooper, 2006, 2008; Johannes, 
2006; Verizon, 2008, 2009, 2010; ITRC, 2008, 2009, 2010).    
4. THE 2009 RESEARCH RESULTS  
This section details the results for the research carried out during 2009, from the 
disks that were obtained in the UK, the USA, Germany, France and Australia. As 
in previous years, the results of the study are broken down into the individual 
countries to enable comparison.   
For the 174 disks obtained in the UK:   
 
? 60 (34% of the disks) were physically damaged and could not be 
accessed.  
? 32 (18% of the readable disks) had been wiped and contained no data.  
? Of the remaining 82 (47 % of the readable disks)2,   
o 28 (34%) contained sufficient information for the organisation 
that they had come from to be identified.   
o 36 (45%) contained sufficient information for individuals to 
be identified.  
o 18 (22%) indicated that attempts had been made to remove 
data from the disks by deletion, formatting or reinstallation of 
an operating system.  
? 2 (2% of the readable disks) contained information that was 
considered to be illicit.  
                                                 
2 The three categories in this section are independent of each other. A disk may contain 
information on just an individual or an organisation or both and any of them may also 
have had attempts made to remove the data.  
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For the 74 disks that were obtained from North America:   
? 13 (18% of the disks) could not be accessed  
? 23 (38% of the readable disks) had been wiped and contained no data.  
? Of the remaining 38 (62% of the readable disks),   
o 14 (37%) contained sufficient information for the organisation 
that they had come from to be identified.   
o 18 (47%) contained sufficient information for individuals to 
be identified.  
o 10 (26%) indicated that attempts had been made to remove 
data from the disks by deletion, formatting or reinstallation of 
an operating system.  
? 6 (10% of the readable disks) contained information that was 
considered to be illicit.  
 
For the 39 disks that were obtained from Germany:   
? 8 (21% of the disks) were not in working order and could not be 
accessed.  
? 16 (41% of the readable disks) had been wiped and contained no data.  
? Of the remaining 15 (38% of the readable disks),   
o 4 (26%) contained sufficient information for the organisation 
that they had come from to be identified.   
o 3 (20%) appeared to be from individuals.   
o 3 (20%) indicated that attempts had been made to remove data 
from the disks by deletion, formatting or reinstallation of an 
operating system.  
 
For the 17 disks that were obtained from France:   
? 8 (47%) of the disks were physically damaged and could not be 
accessed  
? 4 (24% of the readable disks) had been wiped and contained no data.  
? Of the remaining 5 (29%),   
o 1 (20%) contained sufficient information for the organisation 
that they had come from to be identified.  
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o 1 (20%) contained sufficient information for individuals to be 
identified.  
o 3 (60%) indicated that attempts had been made to remove data 
from the disks by deletion, formatting or reinstallation of an 
operating system. 
 
For the 42 disks that were obtained from Australia:   
? 5 (12%) of the disks were physically damaged and could not be 
accessed  
? 14 (33% of the readable disks) had been wiped and contained no data.  
? Of the remaining 23 (55%),   
o 18 (78%) contained sufficient information for the organisation 
that they had come from to be identified.  
o 6 (26%) contained sufficient information for individuals to be 
identified.  
 
Table 1 shows a comparison of the results for each of the annual disk surveys.  
  
  
Note: The results for the wiped disks are given as a percentage of the disks that 
were readable.  
Note: The results for data present are given as a percentage of readable disks 
that had not been wiped.  
  
The results of the 2009 survey appear to indicate that there is a consistent 
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improvement in the results in the majority of the areas measured over the period. 
There has been consistent improvement in the reduction of both commercial and 
personal data found over the whole period. It is interesting and a matter of 
concern to note that, while there has not been consistency, the general proportion 
of disks that have been wiped of all data has also reduced over the period.  
Comment: The disks that are obtained for the study are selected from the widest 
possible range of sources. It was noted by the people responsible for the 
procurement of disks in the USA that there had been a noticeable increase in the 
number of disks offered for sale in the USA that were advertised as having been 
wiped.  Because these were specifically advertised as having been wiped, such 
disks were not procured for the study as they were no longer considered to be part 
of the generic „random‟ group of disks that were available.  In the future, such 
disks will be included in order to ensure that the overall study results are not 
distorted and also to give a view on the effectiveness of the methods used to wipe 
the disks. 
The trend that had been previously noted, with the exception of the 2005 results, 
in the  proportion of the disks that were faulty/unreadable has continued and, the 
level has now declined over the period from 2006 to 2009 from 36% to 27%.   
Table 2 below shows a comparison of the results obtained during the 2009 study 
from the disks acquired in the different regions.  
  
 
  
Note: The results for the wiped disks are given as a percentage of the disks that 
were readable.  
Note: The results for data present are given as a percentage of readable disks 
that had not been wiped.  
  
The results of the 2009 survey by individual regions have again revealed what 
appears to be a number of disparities between the regions. The number of disks 
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that were obtained that were unreadable still varies considerably. The numbers 
this year ranged from 12 percent in the Australia to 47 percent in France.   
The second disparity that was noted was that while the general trend in the level 
of data from which an organisation could be identified has consistently reduced 
over the period, there was a noticeable increase in the proportion of disks from 
Australia that contained such information. The results from the study this year 
found that 61 percent of disks that were readable and had not been wiped 
contained sufficient information for the organisation that they had been used by to 
be identified. Last year the results for Australia were also high with 60 percent.  
Over the period of the last five years there are clear indications that there are 
trends developing that the numbers of disk that contain information relating to 
organisations and individuals is reducing. Unfortunately, it has also been noted 
that because of the increasing volume of storage capacity of the disk, where such 
data is found, the quantity appears to be increasing.  
An indication of the quantity and type of material that was recovered during the 
2009 research includes disks that originated in local government, the healthcare 
sector, commercial and the media.  Examples of the type of data recovered 
include:  
One disk from the UK contained information from a local council.  This included 
numerous documents that appear to have originated within the payroll department 
at the organisation.  The documents include some of the following details, which 
were relevant up to 2008:  
  
? Automatic credit recall letter to the Royal Bank of Scotland  
? Account numbers and sort codes used by the various departments 
within  the Council  
? Names, addresses, payroll numbers, amounts paid and various other 
details relating to employees at the organisation  
? Emails detailing specifics of the individual circumstances of 
employees, including sick-pay arrangements, queries regarding over 
and under-payments and finance requirements  
? Details of queries made to the Royal Bank of Scotland regarding the 
organisation’s accounts  
 
Additionally, a number of encrypted Microsoft Access databases were recovered 
and decrypted by the analysts involved in this study.  They each used the same 
weak password for decryption, and while they were apparently empty, the names 
of individual tables and fields within the databases suggest that they would have 
been used to store a wealth of valuable information.  Their structure also suggests 
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that they were intended to be used by more than one software applications.  
A disk recovered in the UK was from a computer supply company.  The 
information contained on the disk included details of contracts to supply 
computers to local councils in the UK. The details included full specifications for 
computing and networking equipment, as well as a complete network topology 
and full addressing details, as well as the usual order and shipping information.    
A disk recovered in the UK had originated in a direct marketing company. The 
disk contained documents that gave details of the breakdowns of calls from the 
broadband users of a major Internet Service provider, complete with details 
regarding which departments within the service provider handled which calls, and 
the sales and conversation rates achieved by each.  These were complemented by 
a large body of training material marked as being provided by a subsidiary of the 
service provider.    
Another disk recovered in the UK from a media supply company contained a 
large number of documents revealing details of computer and software systems 
delivered to the company’s customers.  These details include computer 
specifications, details of the software systems in use on them, the layout and 
architecture of the databases used by the customers, and complete network 
topologies of the deployed systems.  These were complemented by lists of IP 
address mappings, including mappings of domain names to public IP addresses, 
and public IP addresses to internal network topologies.  
One disk was recovered that originated from a telecommunications company in 
the UK. Included in the material recovered were details of a merger with another 
communications carrier that had taken place in 2004 and a large number of 
documents that included:   
  
? Itemised telephone bills  
o Names of account holders  
o Addresses of account holders  
o Account numbers of account holders  
o Invoice numbers  
o Telephone numbers held by account holders  
o Full call histories for each billing period  
  
? Letters to customers  
o Names, addresses, phone numbers of account holders  
o Account termination details  
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o Port Authorisation Codes (PAC) for transferring numbers  
 
? Lists of customers  
o Names, phone numbers, addresses of account holders  
o Contract periods  
o PAC codes  
o Last four digits of credit card used to pay bills  
 
? List of business accounts  
o Name of business holding account  
o Number of phone numbers held by each account  
  
One disk recovered in the UK had originated from an International Design 
Consultancy. This disk contained a number of documents relating to specific jobs 
undertaken by the consultancy.  The individual user of the disk could be identified 
from these, and full details of the prices charged for the jobs were included.  Other 
documents recovered included some documents marked as “CONFIDENTIAL”, 
numerous CVs, and spreadsheets detailing the use of expenses.  Additionally, a 
global contact list was identified that appeared to hold the names, phone numbers, 
and email addresses of contacts within a large number of companies that the disk 
holder presumably worked with.  
Another disk that was recovered in the UK from a specialist recruitment agency 
contained a large number of documents from the period 2003-2007.  The details 
held in these documents are summarised below:  
  
? A large number of CVs  
? Database of employees – Names, addresses, contact information, etc.  
? Databases of skill sets – Names, addresses  
? List of addresses used for mailshots  
? Details of bank charges incurred  
? Cash-flow spreadsheets  
? Commission calculations for employees  
? Bank reconciliations  
? Direct debits maintained by the organisation  
? Invoice breakdowns  
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? Details of corporate credit card usage  
? Details of petty cash usage  
? Details of wages paid to employees  
 
A disk that was recovered in Australia was from a major Australian television 
network and contained a number of confidential documents. The drive had been 
simply removed from an array and no effort had been made to remove the data. It 
disclosed the personal phone numbers of members of parliament, internal memos, 
story lines and a range of highly confidential material. These documents included 
a diary of staff member who felt they were being bullied in the work place, 
documents on staff performance, scheduling for shows and letters of invitation for 
various dignitaries and public figures. The files on the drive were as new as 2 
months at time of purchase.  
Another disk from Australia was from a major Australian accounting firm. It 
contained tax file numbers, customer data, letters of advice, letters of tax rulings, 
peoples personal income, personal asset base and company and business data. It 
contained the type of confidential data one would expect to find in a tax and 
accounting firm. The files found amount to a very serious breach of customer 
confidentiality. The drive again had been removed from an array with no attempt 
to cleanse the data.  
Another set of disks from Australia was from a major Australian medical services 
company. The disks storage capacity was large (500GB) and contained a 
significant quantity of patient data including tests, test outcomes, letters of advice 
and of course extensive personal medical histories of ongoing patients. This data 
was extensive and highly confidential. In addition it contained business data 
relating to the practices it managed in a metropolitan area. This included doctors 
billing rates, profitability and other financial performance data relating to doctors 
performance. There were also various performance evaluations of these doctors. 
These disks had simply been formatted and no real attempt had been made to 
cleanse the data.  
A disk recovered in Australia that had been formatted had evidence of home user 
activity (Gameboy ROMS and manuals), however it also appeared to have 
previously belong to a major chemicals company and had applications for 
approvals for pesticides and herbicides as well as internal memos, field trial data 
and information on upcoming products. Sales and marketing information was also 
present.  
A disk recovered in Australia that had been formatted had belonged to a manager 
for a major IT Services company. Both corporate and personal financial 
documents were present. A number of Spreadsheets, some password protected 
were also found and were recoverable. The data in the spreadsheets referred to 
processing orders and instructions for batch processing for a financial institution.  
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In addition to the apparently corporate-owned disks summarised above, a number 
of disks that appear to have belonged to personal users were identified.  The 
information recovered from these disks was somewhat similar in every case, and 
is summarised neatly by the following examples:  
On one disk the documents recovered revealed the user”s name, occupation, the 
specific organisation and address at which they worked, as well as telephone 
numbers, email addresses, a complete employment history and details of their 
personal education.  A large amount of personal email was also recovered.  
Another disk contained the user’s name, address and personal details were 
recovered from documents found on the disk, as well as a CV, a personal diary, 
and a significant amount of pornographic material.  Additionally, web pages 
recovered from the disk reveal the last five digits of two credit card numbers, as 
well as their associated expiry dates and cardholder names.  
On another disk, the user’s name, address, employment details and complete CV 
were recovered from the disk.  A large amount of corporate email from the user’s 
workplace was identified, much of which included the contact details of 
individuals within the company.  Additionally, several conversations with 
application programmers were identified in which the details of software 
behaviour were described and in some cases the actual code was found to have 
been communicated via these email messages.  
On another disk, the user’s personal details were identified from documents 
recovered from the disk, as well as some details relating to individual jobs 
undertaken, online auctions won, and a significant amount of pornographic 
material.  Additionally, a large body of personal email was identified, including 
some specific examples from online services that emailed the user’s password to 
them in plaintext.  
In addition to these examples, one personal disk was analysed that was found to 
contain pornographic images involving children.  Upon identification of these 
images, analysis was suspended and the disk was immediately handed over to the 
police.  
Data security breaches have continued with increasing regularity and are reported 
in the press on a very regular basis. The (ITRC, 2009) report indicates that the 
level of breaches reported has dropped from a peak of 656 reported breaches at 
the end of 2008 to 498 in 2009.  Unfortunately, by October 2010, the same source 
reports that 580 breaches have already been recorded, which would indicate that 
the general trend in the number of breaches continues to increase.  
  
In the previous reports, it was highlighted that the subject of the disposal of disks 
on which the data has not been effectively destroyed first made the news in the 
Canadian Globe and Mail (Canadian Globe and Mail, 1993) and that the subject 
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has been reported with increasing frequency in the intervening years to date. The 
reports that appear in the press normally relate to high profile data losses. Within 
the last year, reports have included:  
  
From the UK:  
A (BBC News, 2010) report on a fine imposed on Zurich Insurance of £2.3m 
over the loss of customers' data. The UK operation of Zurich Insurance was 
fined by the Financial Services Authority (FSA) for losing the personal 
details of 46,000 of its customers. The information that was lost during a 
routine transfer to a data storage centre in South Africa included, in some 
cases, bank account and credit card information.  The information went 
missing in August 2008, but Zurich did not become aware of the loss until a 
year later, when it then began notifying customers.  
An (ICO, 2010) report from the UK Information Commissioner’s office that 
there had been 464 security breaches reported to them during the year 2009-
10.  This compared to 434 in the previous year and 277 in the year before 
that.  
A (BBC News, 2009) report that three of the HSBC firms have been fined in 
excess of £3m by the Financial Services Authority (FSA) for failing to 
adequately protect customers' confidential details from being lost or stolen 
after it was reported that information had been lost in the post on two separate 
occasions. The FSA cited concerns that it had found that "large amounts" of 
unencrypted customer details had been sent via post or courier to third parties.  
The FSA also stated that confidential information about customers was also 
found on open shelves or in unlocked cabinets. The failures were attributed to 
staff not having been given sufficient training on how to identify and manage 
risks such as identity theft.   
A (Kouns, 2010) article on a report from the Ministry of Defence that it had 
had 1,705 data loss incidents had occurred during the period from 2005 to 
2009.   
An (Infosecurity, 2010) article that British firms had been warned over laptop 
data lethargy in a recently completed survey by Absolute Software. They 
survey reports that around two-thirds (65%) of IT managers have no idea 
where their organisation's mobile devices are, and that almost half of 
respondents are unable to manage PCs and Macs together.  
From France:  
According to the (Ponemon, 2009) report, the worst data breach in France last 
year cost an unidentified company 6.4 million Euros. The recently released 
report - French Cost of a Data Breach, revealed that each item of data lost in 
France cost an average of 89 euro.  
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From the USA:  
A (Singel, 2009) report that an investigation was underway into the possible 
compromise of the records of 70 million veterans that put them at risk of 
identity theft. The issue related to a defective hard drive that the National 
Archives and Records Administration (NARA) had sent back to its vendor for 
repair and recycling without first destroying the data.  
An Article from (AlertsecXpress,2010) reported that the parent company of 
American Airlines, AMR had suffered from one of the largest and possibly 
the most severe data breach incidents in this year when a computer disk was 
stolen from the Texas based corporate headquarters of AMR. The disk 
contained sensitive information on over 79,000 current, former and retired 
employees.  The drive contained images of microfilm files, with names, 
addresses, dates of birth, Social Security numbers and a “limited amount” of 
bank account information and possibility also health insurance information.  
An Article by (Westervelt, 2009) stated that Health Net Inc. had reported a 
healthcare data security breach that resulted in the loss of patient data, 
affecting 1.5 million customers. The managed healthcare provider stated that 
the lost portable external hard drive contained files, a mixture of medical data, 
Social Security numbers and other personally identifiable information on 
446,000 Connecticut patients.   
An Article by (Von Bergen, 2010) reported that a hard drive from a portable 
computer belonging to the Keystone Mercy Health Plan and AmeriHealth 
Mercy Health Plan had been lost.  The drive was believed to hold up to 
280,000 names, address and health information of Medicaid members in 
Pennsylvania.  The companies stated that the portable computer hard drive, 
which was used at community health fairs, was lost within the companies' 
corporate offices.  
From Australia:  
A report (Kouns, 2010a) on the exposure of user information by the 
Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC). The report stated that ABC had 
sent an email to players of its latest augmented reality (AR) game "Bluebird", 
saying that names, email addresses and passwords of 880 players of the game 
were available for download via an archive. The problem remained in place 
for almost a month.  
A report by (Gedda, 2009), that many Australian government agencies did 
not have appropriate controls covering the use of portable storage devices 
(PSDs) for the handling of personal information. According to new research 
by the Office of the Privacy Commissioner, this personal information is being 
lost at an alarming rate. According to the report, more than 58% of agencies 
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have experienced the loss or theft of an agency-issued PSD within the past 12 
months.   
As has been reported in earlier studies, before 2005 the subject of data losses was 
only reported in the mainline news once every two or three years. In the USA 
alone in 2009 there were 498 (ITRC, 2009) reports of data losses. One feature that 
is worth noting is that despite an apparent reduction in the total number of losses, 
the number of records disclosed has increased significantly. This is thought to be 
a result of the increasing storage volumes of the disks being disposed of.  
The study this year has reinforced the findings of those in the preceding years, and 
while there is a trend of an improving situation with regard to the release of 
personal and corporate data there are still a significant number of disks found that 
contained sensitive information. The potential effect of the failure of organisations 
and individuals to properly remove or destroy sensitive information on disks that 
are disposed of is that this information is accessible to the purchasers of the disks 
and may cause embarrassment, potential financial losses and leave the original 
owner susceptible to blackmail or provide the opportunity for identity theft.  
5. CONCLUSION  
The improvements in the results that were noted over the last four years have 
largely been confirmed, with a small but steady reduction on the proportion of the 
disks that contain information from which an organisation or an individual can be 
identified. The number of disks that had been wiped has shown no consistent 
pattern over the period and it is difficult to draw any meaningful conclusion from 
the results other than that they are consistently lower than should be expected.  
There is clearly an ongoing requirement for improvements in the education and 
awareness of staff within organisations of the potential risks of data leaking into 
the public domain and of the actions that should be taken to ensure the safe 
removal or destruction of information stored on computer disks. It is also clear 
that at the individual, home user level, people still do not realise the risks that the 
disposal of computers and the disks that they contain pose and that many do not 
know how to securely dispose of the data.  
It is increasingly difficult to believe, given the levels of publicity that the issue has 
received, that neither organisations nor individuals are aware of the potential 
problems that can occur when failing to take suitable measures for the destruction 
or removal of data. It is therefore likely that the results of the study are, at least in 
part, a result of;   
a. The time it takes to organisations to develop, validate, implement 
and promulgate the new processes and procedures required to 
address the issues.  
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b. An ongoing lack of commitment or the structure to implement 
education and awareness campaigns at the levels that are 
required.  
c. A failure to understand the problem at an organisational and 
governmental level and a failure to prioritise the issue.  
6. RECOMMENDATIONS  
Throughout the period that this research has been taking place, a number of 
recommendations have been made and reiterated regarding the measures that can 
be taken by both organisations and individuals to reduce the level of sensitive 
information that is released when disposing of computer devices and their hard 
disks.  These are again detailed below, together with new recommendations:    
 
? User Education - A public awareness campaign by Government, the 
media, commerce and/or academia. An example of this is the 
information provided by the disk manufacturer Seagate in their “Drive 
Disposal Best Practices3 ‟ documents or documents containing advice 
such as “How to Permanently Erase Data from a Hard Disk”4. 
Organisations such as the SANS Institute now provide courses such as 
the “Security 565 - Data Leakage Prevention”5 course.  
? Risk Assessments – Carry out risk assessments for the organisation to 
determine the level of sensitivity of the information that has been and 
is currently stored on disks.  
? Best Practice - The introduction into organisations of procedures to 
ensure that computer systems and computer hard disks are disposed of 
in an appropriate manner. Examples of this include the Cornell 
University Best Practices for Media Destruction6 and the Enterprise 
Strategy Group White paper on Information-Centric Security and Data 
Erasure7.  
                                                 
3 Seagate - Drive Disposal Best Practices, 
http://www.seagate.com/docs/pdf/whitepaper/Disposal_TP582-1-0710US.pdf 
(Accessed 24 Aug 2010)  
4 Sedory, DB (2008), How To Permanently Erase Data from a Hard Disk, 
http://mirror.href.com/thestarman/asm/mbr/WIPE.html (Accessed 15 Sept 2010) 
5 SANS Security 565 Course - Data Leakage Prevention, http://www.sans.org/security-
training/data-leakage-prevention-in-depth-1372-mid (Accessed 15 Sept 2010)  
6 Cornell University Best Practices for Media Destruction, 
http://www.cit.cornell.edu/security/depth/practices/media_destruct.cfm (Accessed 20 
Aug 2010  
7 Enterprise Strategy Group White paper on Information-Centric Security and Data 
Erasure, http://www.emc.com/collateral/analyst-reports/esg-wp-emc-security-jul-
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? Data Erasure – The development of tools such as Blancco data erasure 
tool8 or the Disk Doctors Data Sanitizer tool9 and access to facilities to 
enable individuals to effectively remove the information from their 
computers.  
? Physical Destruction - Where appropriate, the physical destruction of 
disks that have contained sensitive information using services such as 
the Ultratec Secure Data Erasure service10 or that offered by 
DataTerminators11 or Blancco data destruction services12.  
? Encryption - The full or partial encryption of hard disks to ensure that 
information cannot be easily recovered.  This can be achieved by 
using software such as TrueCrypt13, PGP whole disk encryption14 or 
the IdooSoft USB encryption tool15 or hardware encryption devices 
such as the Secure Data Vault16.  
? Asset Tracking - Organisations may be able to more effectively secure 
their data if asset tracking was conducted at a storage device level. 
While this would involve the tagging of disks within the computers, it 
would allow for the individual items of storage media to be tracked. It 
is accepted that this would be a time consuming process but it would 
allow for the tracking of each item of storage media.  
? Legal – Assign responsibility to those charged with managing the 
disposal of discarded or damaged hard disks. Disks found to be faulty 
should have the same disposal practices applied to them as disks 
removed from a working system. Develop processes for the return of 
disks still under warranty to the manufacturer.  
                                                                                                                      
06.pdf (Accessed 15 Sept 2010)  
8 Blancco - http://www.blancco.com/en/ (Accessed 16 Sept 2010) 
9 Data Sanitizer - http://www.diskdoctors.net/data-sanitizer/software.html  
10 Ultratec Limited - http://www.ultratec.co.uk/services/dataerasure.asp (Accessed 15 
Sept 2010) 
11 DataTerminators - http://www.data-terminators.co.uk/ (Accessed 16 Sept 2010)  
12 Blancco Data destruction services - 
http://www.dataerasure.com/physical_destruction.htm (Accessed 15 Sept 2010)  
13 TrueCrypt - http://www.truecrypt.org/downloads.php (Accessed 16 Sept 2010)  
14 PGP Corporation, Whole disk encryption - 
http://www.pgp.com/products/wholediskencryption/index.html (Accessed 16 Sept 
2010)  
15 IdooSoft USB Encryption tool - http://www.idooencryption.com/how-to-encrypt-
usb.htm (Accessed 20 Sept 2010) 16 Secure Systems Secure Data Vault - 
http://www.securesystems.com.au/ (Accessed 20 Sept 2010)  
16 Secure Systems Secure Data Vault - http://www.securesystems.com.au/ (Accessed 
20 Sept 2010) 
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